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1. Introduction 
Stated choice experiments are used extensively to create data capable of modelling choices to 
obtain parameter estimates that describe the preferences of individuals for specific attributes of 
alternatives within a pre-defined choice setting (Louviere et al. 2000). The popularity of such 
choice experiments is in part a product of the lack of appropriate revealed preference data in 
situations where choosing amongst a number of alternatives can be observed in real markets, but 
also due to the ability, within a single unified theoretical framework, to investigate the potential 
take up of alternatives which do not currently exist in terms of the levels and mix of attributes 
and/or uniqueness beyond a set of prescribed attributes. 
It is common practice for analysts to pool the data from a sample of respondents, accounting for 
the presence of multiple observations within each respondent, and then to estimate a discrete 
choice model, accounting to varying degrees for observed and unobserved preference 
heterogeneity, and more recently also scale heterogeneity (see Fiebig et al. 2009 and Greene and 
Hensher 2010 as examples). There is also a growing interest in investigating the role that 
specific attribute processing heuristics play in conditioning the influence of each attribute 
associated with each alternative (see Hensher 2010 for an overview, Hess and Hensher (in press 
2010), and Cameron and DeShazo 2008), using a variety of self-explication and functional-form 
inferred responses. Another area of growing interest, particularly in the non-market valuation 
literature, is research into behavioural explanations for the preference changes that appear to 
occur over a sequence of choice tasks, using parametric (Bateman et al. 2008, Day et al. 2009, 
McNair et al. 2010a) and non-parametric tests (Day and Pinto 2010) and equality-constrained 
latent class models (McNair et al. 2010b). 
What we believe is not given enough emphasis is the extent to which we can learn from an 
interrogation of each response at the individual and choice set level, and set up candidate rules 
that align with one or more possible processing rules used by an individual, to reveal their 
choice response that satisfy specific analyst-prescribed rationality tests. While we can never be 
certain that the rule is applied, we are seeking out a way to gain confidence in the evidence, 
given that some pundits believe that respondents are known to make choices which have no 
rational attachment.  
To illustrate the focus of this paper, we reproduce, in Table 1, data from one respondent in one 
of many choice experiments the authors have conducted, in the context of choosing amongst 
three routes for a commuter trip, where the first route description is the reference or status quo 
(SQ) alternative associated with a recent trip. The design attributes are free flow time (FF), 
slowed down time (SDT), running cost (Cost), toll if applicable (Toll), and overall trip time 
variability (Var) (times are in minutes, costs in dollars, and time variability in plus or minus 
minutes). Focussing on these five attributes only, we highlight in green the most attractive level 
(e.g., lowest FF), and propose that if an alternative had the most attractive level on at least one 
attribute, and that alternative was chosen, then we can reasonably suggest that the respondent 
was rational in their choice, based of course on only the offered attributes. There could be other 
reasons why an alternative is chosen, regardless of the attribute levels and relativity, such as 
satisfaction with the status quo or the adoption of a minimum regret calculus in contrast to a 
utility maximisation calculus (see Chorus 2009 and Hensher et al. 2010).  However, on the face 
of the observed attribute evidence, the 16 choice scenarios satisfy a rule of rational choice in 16 
situations. Five of the choice scenarios show the status quo as the preferred alternative. The 
‘rationality’ test assumes that all attributes (and levels) are relevant and that a fully 
compensatory processing strategy is active. It may be that this individual adopts one or more 
attribute processing rules in evaluating the choice scenarios, which may be the basis of choice in 
any of the 16 choice sets, regardless of whether they have passed the ‘rationality’ test used 
above.  
Supplementary data associated with self-explication on whether specific attributes were ignored 
or added up (where they have a common metric) might also be brought to bear, to add additional 
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insights into the choice responses. No attributes were ignored by this respondent, as reported by 
the self-explication questions. Looking at the possibility that this individual may have added up 
FF and SDT and/or COST and TOLL, we cannot find any evidence within the ‘rationality’ test 
that it would have failed if attribute addition (TotTime, TotCost) had not been applied, although 
this may have assisted in making the choice. 
Table 1:  Example of 16 choice scenarios evaluated by a respondent 
Choice scenario Alternative TotTime TotCost Var FF SDT Cost Toll Choice1 Rational = Y
1 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
1 2 48 5.7 8 14 34 2.6 3.1 1 Y
1 3 36 8 6 14 22 4.5 3.5 0 Y
2 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y
2 2 40 7.1 8 6 34 4.5 2.6 0 Y
2 3 44 4.7 6 10 34 1.6 3.1 0 Y
3 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
3 2 28 7 8 14 14 3.5 3.5 1 Y
3 3 40 2.6 6 6 34 2.6 0 0 Y
4 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
4 2 28 4.5 2 14 14 4.5 0 1 Y
4 3 48 4.2 8 14 34 1.6 2.6 0 Y
5 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
5 2 44 8 4 10 34 4.5 3.5 0 Y
5 3 36 1.6 2 14 22 1.6 0 1 Y
6 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y
6 2 48 5.1 6 14 34 1.6 3.5 0 Y
6 3 48 3.5 4 14 34 3.5 0 0 Y
7 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y
7 2 44 6.6 2 10 34 3.5 3.1 0 Y
7 3 48 6.1 8 14 34 2.6 3.5 0 Y
8 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
8 2 36 7.6 6 14 22 4.5 3.1 0 Y
8 3 20 5.1 4 6 14 1.6 3.5 1 Y
9 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y
9 2 48 4.2 2 14 34 1.6 2.6 0 Y
9 3 28 6.6 8 6 22 3.5 3.1 0 Y
10 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
10 2 20 4.7 4 6 14 1.6 3.1 1 Y
10 3 44 7 2 10 34 3.5 3.5 0 Y
11 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
11 2 32 1.6 8 10 22 1.6 0 1 Y
11 3 28 6.1 6 14 14 3.5 2.6 0 Y
12 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y
12 2 48 2.6 4 14 34 2.6 0 0 Y
12 3 40 7.1 2 6 34 4.5 2.6 0 Y
13 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
13 2 24 5.2 6 10 14 2.6 2.6 1 Y
13 3 48 7.6 4 14 34 4.5 3.1 0 Y
14 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
14 2 40 3.5 6 6 34 3.5 0 1 Y
14 3 32 5.2 4 10 22 2.6 2.6 0 Y
15 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
15 2 36 6.1 4 14 22 3.5 2.6 0 Y
15 3 28 5.7 2 14 14 2.6 3.1 1 Y
16 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y
16 2 28 6.1 2 6 22 2.6 3.5 1 Y
16 3 24 4.5 8 10 14 4.5 0 0 Y  
 
The following sections of the paper undertake a more formal inquiry using another data set 
collected in 2007 in New Zealand. The paper is organised as follows. We briefly describe the 
data, followed by a statistical assessment of the data in the search for possible rules that explain 
specific choice responses that are rational or not under specific assumptions. We then discuss 
the evidence, and conclude with a statement of the degree of confidence one might have in the 
behavioural sense of the data emanating from a stated choice experiment. 
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2. The data setting 
As part of a larger study to evaluate the costs and benefits of a new tollroad proposal in New 
Zealand, we undertook field work in late 2007 to identify the preferences of a sample of 132 
commuters, 115 non-commuters and 124 individuals travelling on employer business in the 
catchment area south of Auckland. A stated choice experiment was included together with 
questions that sought information of a recent trip which was used to construct the pivoted 
attribute levels of the non-status quo or reference alternatives. There were 16 choice scenarios in 
which the respondent compared the levels of times and costs of a current/recent trip against two 
alternative opportunities to complete the same trip described by other levels of times and costs. 
The respondent had to choose one of these alternatives.  The profile of the attribute range is 
given in Table 2 with an illustrative stated choice scenario screen in Figure 1. 
Table 2:  Profile of the attribute range in the choice experiment design 
Attribute Levels 
Free Flow Time -0.3, -0.15, 0, 0.15, 0.3 
Slowed Down Time -0.3, -0.15, 0, 0.15, 0.3 
Trip Time Variability ±0%, ±,5%, ±10%, ±15% 
Running Cost -0.4, -0.1, 0 ,0.2, 0.4 
Toll Cost $0, $0.5, $1, $1.5, $2, $2.5, $3, $3.5, $4 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  An example of a stated choice screen 
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A few additional rules were imposed on the design:  
(i) Free flow and slowed times1
(ii) Some travel time variability was enforced to ensure that respondents entered a best and 
worst departure time that was different to their actual leave time; given that it is feasible 
for their recent trip to have the best or worst departure time. We allowed the best and 
worst departure times to be reported as the same as their recent time, and where this 
occurred we set an artificial base as per the same rule in (i). 
 were set to five minutes if the respondent entered zero for 
their current trip;  
In addition, supplementary questions were asked upon completion of all 16 choice scenarios on 
whether specific attributes were ignored. Given the focus of this paper, other details of the study 
are not provided. 
 
3. Investigating candidate evidential rules 
3.1  Overall descriptive profile 
The rationality test presented above for one observation can be applied across the 6,048 
observations in the New Zealand data. When all attributes are assumed to be relevant, we find 
that over 99.9 percent of the observations pass the rationality test associated with at least one 
attribute being best on the chosen alternative. Over 99.7 percent of the observations pass this 
test when we allow for the self-explicated response on attribute non-preservation. 
We ran simple logit models to explore the possible influence of the commuter’s age, income and 
gender under full attribute relevance and attribute self-explication. Income and gender had no 
influence, but age had a statistically significant impact under attribute processing (based on 
respondent self-explication of whether an attribute was ignored or not), with the probability of 
satisfying the rationality test increasing as the commuter ages. 
Table 3 shows the proportion (and counts) of rational choice sets by choice task sequence 
number, suggesting that out of 6,048 choice sets for 378 respondents, there is no noticeable 
deterioration in rational response as the respondent works through the choice sets from set 1 to 
set 162
                                                 
1 The distinction between free flow and slowed down time is solely to promote the differences in the quality of travel time between 
various routes – especially a tolled route and a non-tolled route, and is separate to the influence of total time. 
2 We also ran two simple logit models in which the dependent variable was a binary variable, (where 1 indicated that the 
alternative chosen had at least one attribute that was best across all three alternatives for a choice scenario), and a series of 15 
choice sequence dummy variables, to see if there was a relationship between choice scenario sequence and response rationality. 
One model assumed all attributes are relevant, and the other accounted for the respondent’s self-explicated response on whether 
an attribute was ignored or not. We were unable to identify any systematic influences under full relevance; in the case of attribute 
preservation, there were also no significant effects. 
 
. 
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Table 3:  Influence of choice sequence on choice response 
Choice Set Sequence Assuming full attribute relevance Allowing for attribute non-preservation 
 Proportion rational Count irrartional Proportion rational Count irrartional 
1 0.999339 4 0.996693 20 
2 1 0 0.996858 19 
3 0.999182 4 0.996197 23 
4 0.999339 4 0.99752 15 
5 0.999835 1 0.997024 18 
6 0.999008 6 0.99752 15 
7 0.999504 3 0.999008 6 
8 0.999669 2 0.997189 17 
9 0.999008 6 0.996528 21 
10 0.999339 4 0.997851 13 
11 0.999339 4 0.99752 15 
12 0.999504 3 0.997189 17 
13 0.999339 4 0.997189 17 
14 0.999339 4 0.997024 18 
15 0.999339 4 0.998181 11 
16 1 0 0.998347 10 
 
Choice task response latencies have been used by Haaijer et al. (2000) and Rose and Black 
(2006) to improve the model fit of the final choice models of interest. We took an alternative 
approach, investigating the relationship between the rationality test (both under full attribute 
relevance and stated attribute attendance) and both the amount of time to complete the survey, 
and the amount of time to complete each of the 16 choice scenarios against the rationality test 
(i.e., the response latency). The only statistically significant relationship, as reported in Table 4, 
was between both total time and choice scenario completion time and consistency with the 
rationality test under full attribute relevance, and when attribute processing was taken into 
account in determining compliance with the rationality test. We find that respondents who 
satisfied the rationality test, after accounting for attribute processing, tended to spend more time, 
on average 129.6 seconds overall (noting the sample mean of 1,787 seconds) or 87.5 seconds 
more on the choice scenarios (noting the sample mean of 703.9 seconds) compared to 
respondents who failed the rationality test on one or more choice scenarios. The average time 
was 27.48 seconds, with a standard deviation of 26.03 seconds. 
Table 4:  Choice scenario completion time influences 
Simple Regression 
 Full Relevance APS Ignore 
Constant  27.478 (142.8) 22.1163 (30.8) 
Full Relevance Rationality Test (1,0) 0.0081 (4.39)  
Rationality Test under Attribute Non-
Preservation (1,0) - 5.5856 (7.5) 
R-squared 0.00017 0.0019 
Sample size 6048 
 
3.2  Derivative willingness to pay 
The next test was to estimate choice models that distinguished between (i) the full sample 
(6,048 observations) assuming all attributes are relevant (Full), (ii) the full sample with choice 
scenarios removed when the rationality test failed (5,995 observations) (Rational), (iii) the full 
sample taking into account a self-explicated attribute processing strategy (6,048 observations) 
(Full APS), and (iv) the full APS sample with choice scenarios removed when the rationality 
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test failed (5,793 observations) (Rational APS). The findings on values of travel time savings 
(VTTS) are summarised in Table 5, based on both the running cost (RC) and toll cost (TC) 
parameter estimates3
While the differences are marked in some cases, none of the differences in mean VTTS are 
statistically different, using the delta test to obtain standard errors
. We have also included the percentage changes in the mean VTTS 
estimates as a way of identifying the behavioural implications of failing the strict rationality 
test, as defined by the observed attributes that at least one attribute is the best for the chosen 
alternative, regardless of whether it was the reference alternative or not.  
4
  
  
. This is the case even when 
over four percent of the sample is removed due to a suspicion of irrational choice behaviour. 
This finding suggests that the underlying model is robust, and able to cope with a small 
percentage of seemingly irrational decisions.  
Table 5:  Implications of the rationality test on mean value of travel time savings 
Running cost 
All attributes relevant Attribute processing strategy applied 
$/person hour (VTTS) Full Rational Difference Full APS Rational APS Difference 
Free flow time $13.01 $12.53 3.81% $12.02 $11.62 3.51% 
Slowed down time $13.93 $13.85 0.62% $14.52 $14.53 -0.09% 
Trip time variability $2.57 $2.53 1.51% $2.33 $2.95 -20.83% 
  
  
Toll cost 
All attributes relevant Attribute processing strategy applied 
$/person hour (VTTS) Full Rational Difference Full APS Rational APS Difference 
Free flow time $10.16 $10.51 -3.34% $9.08 $9.73 -6.67% 
Slowed down time $10.88 $11.61 -6.31% $10.96 $12.17 -9.91% 
Trip time variability $2.00 $2.12 -5.48% $1.76 $2.47 -28.61% 
 
3.3  Pairwise alternative rationality test 
A weaker test is to compare the pairs of alternatives, so that even where an alternative from the 
full set might be chosen when it has no best attributes, it can still have a better level on a 
pairwise comparison. If the pair includes the reference alternative, it may be that this contrast 
delivers an outcome that passes a pairwise rationality test on more occasions. To our surprise, of 
the 54 choice sets that failed the strict rationality test (listed in Appendix), not one respondent 
chose the reference alternative, with 46 of the 54 choosing the third alternative. On closer 
inspection, of the 54 choice sets that failed the full choice set rationality test, all but one 
satisfied the pairwise rationality test, with 20 of the chosen alternatives having the better level 
on 5 attributes, 17 on four attributes, 14 on three attributes, and two on two attributes. This 
suggests that if a three-way and/or a two-way assessment of alternatives are both candidate 
processing strategies, then only one respondent failed both rationality tests on only one choice 
set.   
Could it be that just as some researchers suggest that there is a bias towards the reference 
alternative, there might be circumstances where the bias is reversed?  For modelling, it may be 
appropriate to remove the reference alternative and treat their processing strategy as elimination 
by alternatives, allowing the reference alternative to be specified as ‘non-existent’. This is 
equivalent to non-preservation of an alternative in contrast to an attribute. Within this dataset, 
23 respondents chose the reference alternative for all 16 choice tasks while a further 17 
respondents chose the alternative for 15 out of 16 choice tasks. However, with 70 respondents 
never choosing the reference alternative, total avoidance of the reference alternative was much 
more common than total avoidance of the two hypothetical alternatives.  
                                                 
3 All parameter estimates are statistically significant in all four models. 
4 Details are available on request from the authors. 
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If an alternative passes the pairwise comparison test, that is, it is better on at least one attribute 
than the alternative to which it is compared, we can state that it is not dominated by the other 
alternative. Expressed another way, the alternative in question is dominated by the other 
alternative if, for every attribute, the attribute level is equal or worse than the other alternative. 
While the pairwise rationality test applied above to those who failed the three-way rationality 
test found only one case of dominance, an examination of all observations uncovered a wider 
pattern of choice of a dominated alternative. Over the dataset, 46 observations were found to be 
dominated. These are documented in Table 6. The first two columns indicate which alternative 
dominated the chosen alternative, i.e., which alternative was equal or better on all attributes, but 
still not chosen. Of note is the high number for alternative three, where one plausible 
explanation is that respondents are not paying as close attention to the third alternative, and 
hence missing a superior alternative. This explanation is supported by the results from the base 
multinomial logit model (see Table 9 below) where an alternative-specific constant for the 
second alternative is positive and significant, implying that, ceteris paribus, the second 
alternative is preferred to the third, and hence an ordering bias is at play.  
Table 6:  Dominance in the full sample 
Alternative that dominated the chosen alternative Consistent choice of alternatives over all 16 choice tasks 
Reference 10 Always chose reference alternative 9 
SC Alternative 2 7 Never chose reference alternative 10 
SC Alternative 3 28 Other 27 
Reference and  SC Alternative 2 1 - - 
Total 46 Total 46 
 
To be truly effective, the dominance check requires an unlabelled experiment, such that the only 
points of comparison between alternatives are the attributes. In this experiment, while the two 
alternative routes are unlabelled, the reference alternative represents their current route, and thus 
other factors might be influencing whether they choose the reference alternative or one of the 
remaining two alternatives. For nine dominated observations, the respondent always chose the 
reference alternative over 16 choice tasks. This suggests that they were not trading over the 
attributes, such that a new alternative with superior attributes was not preferred. Conversely, for 
10 dominated observations, the respondent never chose the reference alternative, instead trading 
only between the two hypothetical alternatives. In all 10 observations, the reference alternative 
dominated the chosen alternative. The respondent might have been dissuaded from the reference 
alternative by their actual experiences of it. Alternatively, inferences might be made about 
omitted attributes, leading to seemingly irrational choices being made (Lancsar and Louviere 
2006). The remaining observations were by respondents who chose the reference alternative and 
a hypothetical alternative at least once each. We have no clear explanation for their choice of a 
dominated alternative. A preference for, or aversion to, the reference alternative might still have 
been in effect, except with some trading across these alternatives. Alternatively, the dominance 
might be the consequence of not paying attention, for example to the third alternative, as 
discussed above.   
3.4  Influences of dominance and non-trading 
It is often suggested that respondents are non-traders as a result of always selecting the same 
alternative, especially the reference alternative, across all choice sets. There are many reasons 
posited including lack of interest in the choice experiment, regret avoidance, and inertia. We 
investigated design attribute levels and respondent-specific characteristics as possible sources of 
influence in Table 7 (Model 1), where the binary dependent variable equals 1 for 23 
observations who always choose the reference alternative, and zero otherwise for the remaining 
355 respondents. Increased trip length decreases the probability of the respondent always 
choosing the reference alternative, as does a business trip purpose (in contrast to commuting and 
non-commuting). Two attributes that we have expected would be significant were not, namely 
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the variability in total time as a percentage of the worst time for the reference alternative, and 
the percentage of total trip time in slowed down conditions.  
We then ran a binary logit model (Model 2) to investigate possible systematic sources of 
influence on the choice of the reference alternative at a choice set level. This model delivered 
some very significant sources of influence, suggesting variety seeking behaviour (i.e., moving 
away from always choosing the reference alternative) as income increases, trip length increases, 
the trip is for business, the amount of toll road experience increases, and as there is engagement 
in attribute processing leading to an increasing number of attributes not being preserved. This 
latter evidence might be due the presence of greater engagement in evaluating the new 
alternatives. Also, with greater variability in travel times across the reference alternative, 
respondents are less likely to stay with the reference alternative, as expected. However, the sign 
for the percentage of time being in slowed down conditions is positive, which is the opposite 
effect to total time variability. This might suggest that there is relatively more congestion with 
shorter trips, which increases the probability of choosing the reference alternative.  
Having identified some statistically significant influences on bias in favour of, or against, the 
reference alternative across all choice sets, and at a choice set level, we included the findings in 
the base models under full attribute relevance (Model 3) and under attribute non-preservation 
(Model 4). The overall log-likelihood for Model 3 improves from -5428 to -5331. The extra 
reference-alternative-specific characteristics were highly significant, and the reference constant 
became marginally significant and positive, suggesting that we have accounted for a growing 
number of the reasons why respondents do not chose the reference alternative. Similar 
improvements can be found for Model 4, with the log-likelihood improving from -5265 to -
5173. 
Table 7:  Respondent and design influences on the choice of the reference alternative 
 Full Relevance Ignored Attributes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Reference 
Alternative 
chosen for all 
tasks 
Reference 
Alternative 
chosen for 
single task 
Base model with 
extra influences 
Base model with 
extra influences 
Constant -1.4881 (-1.59) 1.1683 (9.34) - - 
Time to complete a choice set (seconds) - 0.0095 (7.95) - - 
Trip length (kilometres) -0.0293 (-2.34) -0.0185 (-15.9) -0.0107 (-8.70) -0.0111 (-8.94) 
Personal gross income ($’000s)  0.0102 (1.24) -0.0034 (-3.21) -0.0044 (-4.01) -0.0042 (-3.72) 
Business trip (compared to commuting and non-
commuting) -1.670 (-2.22) -0.4048 (-6.78) -0.3999 (-6.47) -0.3995 (-6.34) 
Ref alt time variability as percentage of Ref alt worst time -1.6012 (-1.02) -0.9469 (-4.86) -1.1422 (-5.58) -1.0013 (-4.84) 
Percentage of total trip time in slowed down conditions 0.5060 (0.46) 0.3588 (2.46) 0.6835 (4.31) 0.4521 (2.92) 
Amount of recent experience on toll roads (0-6) -0.0147 (-0.11) -0.0342 (-2.03) -0.0465 (-2.65) -0.0416 (-2.33) 
Number of ignored attributes 0.1862 (0.94) -0.0747 (-2.79) - - 
Reference constant (1,0) - - 1.1828 (9.61) 1.1299 (9.11) 
SC1 constant (1,0) - - 0.0730 (1.83) 0.0677 (1.69) 
Free flow time (mins) - - -0.0850 (-26.6) -0.0904 (-26.65) 
Slowed down time (mins) - - -0.0953 (-15.3) -0.1081 (-15.6) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) - - -0.0067 (-1.14) -0.0102 (-1.48) 
Running cost ($) - - -0.3906 (-20.7) -0.4481 (-20.9) 
Toll cost ($) - - -0.5448 (-27.4) -0.6303 (-30.7) 
BIC 0.5357 1.3027 1.7817 1.7296 
Log-likelihood at convergence -77.50 -3930.20 -5331.12 -5173.80 
Sample Size 378 6048 6048 6048 
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3.5  Dimensional vs holistic processing strategies 
The pairwise test is reflective of the ‘majority of confirming dimensions’ rule (MCD) (Russo 
and Dosher 1983), which is concerned with the total count of superior attributes in each 
alternative. Pairs of attributes are compared in turn, with an alternative winning if it has a 
greater number of better attributes. The paired test continues until there is an overall winner. In 
our case, additionally, it might be that the reference alternative is dropped first, resulting in only 
a one pair test. 
To test for the MCD heuristic in this dataset, a total count of best attributes was generated for 
each alternative, and then entered into the utility expressions for all three alternatives. To 
contribute to the count for an alternative, an attribute had to be strictly better than that attribute 
in all other alternatives in the choice set. That is, no ties were allowed5
 
. The distribution of 
number of best attributes is shown in Table 8, both for the full relevance sample, and accounting 
for self-explication attribute non-preservation, with separate reporting for all alternatives and the 
chosen alternative only. The distribution for the chosen alternatives is skewed towards a higher 
number of best attributes in both cases, and higher means can also be observed. This alone does 
not suggest that MCD is being employed, as it would be expected that alternatives with a higher 
number of best attributes would also tend to have higher utilities.  
Table 8:  Number of strictly best attributes per alternative 
Full relevance APS ignore 
 All alternatives Chosen alternative All alternatives Chosen alternative 
Number of best attributes Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage 
0 2758 15.20% 467 7.72% 4703 25.92% 871 14.40% 
1 8245 45.44% 2563 42.38% 8697 47.93% 2950 48.78% 
2 5482 30.21% 2118 35.02% 3862 21.29% 1707 28.22% 
3 1382 7.62% 709 11.72% 777 4.28% 439 7.26% 
4 277 1.53% 191 3.16% 105 0.58% 81 1.34% 
5 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Total 18144 100% 6048 100% 18144 100% 6048 100% 
Mean 1.35 1.60 1.06 1.32 
 
Separate models were estimated allowing for ties, with similar but less significant results 
obtained. The model results are reported in Table 9, with the first column representing the base 
model, with all attributes assumed to be considered. The second column extends this base 
model, such that both the attribute levels and the number of best attributes impact on 
representative utility. The latter is highly significant, and positive in sign, so that as the number 
of best attributes increases, an alternative is more likely to be chosen, as would be expected. 
Additionally, an improvement in log-likelihood and Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) can be 
observed. The third column reports a model where only the number of best attributes and the 
alternative-specific constants are included, and the attribute levels are omitted. While the 
number of best attributes is highly significant, the model fit is considerably worse, suggesting 
that the number of best attributes cannot substitute for the attribute levels themselves.  
                                                 
5 Accounting for ties did not materially affect the findings. 
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Table 9:  Influence of majority of confirming dimensions 
 Full Relevance APS Ignore 
Reference constant 
(1,0) 0.0065 (0.13) -0.0418 (-0.84) 0.5228 (15.96) -0.0417 (-0.89) -0.0797 (-1.67) 0.5149 (15.6) 
SC1 constant (1,0) 0 .0749 (1.88) 0.0862 (2.16) 0.1339 (3.75) 0.0669 (1.67) 0.0821 (2.04) 0.1422 (3.95) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.0899 (-28.3) -0.0853 (-26.0)  -0.0949 (-28.0) -0.0884 (-24.9) - 
Slowed down time 
(mins) -0.0963 (-16.1) -0.0826 (-12.7) - -0.1146 (-16.9) -0.0983 (-13.4) - 
Trip time variability 
(plus/minus mins) -0.0177 (-3.07) -0.0053 (-0.85) - -0.0184 (-2.68) -0.0041 (-0.56) - 
Running cost ($) -0.4147 (-22.2) -0.3871 (-20.1) - -0.4735 (-22.4) -0.4354 (-19.7) - 
Toll cost ($) -0.5312 (-27.5) -0.5274 (-27.4) - -0.6271 (-31.0) -0.6123 (-30.2) - 
# of attributes in an 
alternative that are 
best 
- 0.1041 (4.95) 0.3136 (19.79) - 0.1269 (5.24) 0.4370 (23.9) 
BIC 1.8051 1.803 2.0628 1.7514 1.7483 2.0295 
Log-likelihood at 
convergence -5428.17 -5417.55 -6224.89 -5265.81 -5252.05 -6123.98 
Sample size 6048 
APS Ignored:  
Free flow time (mins) - 944 
Slowed down time 
(mins) - 1504 
Trip time variability 
(plus/minus mins) - 2240 
Running cost ($) - 1120 
Toll cost ($) - 656 
 
While the second model is an improvement, its underlying form suggests that all respondents 
simultaneously consider and trade between both the attribute levels in a typical compensatory 
fashion, and the number of best attributes in each alternative. More plausibly, a respondent 
might resort solely to the MCD heuristic, or refrain from using it entirely. In recognition that 
there may be two classes of respondent, with heuristic application distinguishing between them, 
a latent class model6 was estimated (Table 10). Two classes are defined7
                                                 
6 See Hensher and Greene (2009) for other examples of the identification of attribute processing heuristics with the latent class 
model. 
7 We investigated a three-class model in which the additional class was defined by all attributes plus the number of best attributes. 
The overall fit of the model did not improve and many of the attributes were not statistically significant.  We also estimated a three-
class model with class-specific parameter estimates for attributes included in more than one class, but many parameters were not 
statistically significant. A further model allowing for random parameters was investigated but did not improve on the two-class 
model reported in Table 7. 
, where the utility 
expressions in each class are constrained to represent one of the two heuristics. The first class 
contains the attribute levels and alternative-specific constants, as per the base model, while the 
second class contains only the number of best attributes. A further improvement in model fit is 
obtained with this model, with the log-likelihood improving from -5428.17 for the base model, 
to -5417.55 for the single class model that contains both the levels and the number of best 
attributes, to -5402.47 for the latent class model. Again the number of best attributes parameter 
is statistically significant and of the expected sign. 
The same tests were performed, after accounting for the stated attribute non-preservation 
patterns of the respondents. Any ignored attributes were not included in the count of the number 
of best attributes. The fourth column of Table 9 sets out the base model that accounts for 
attribute non-preservation (or ignoring), which itself fits the data better than when all attributes 
are assumed to be attended to. The fifth column presents the model that accounts for both 
heuristics. The log-likelihood is smaller, at -5252.05 compared to -5265.81 for the base model, 
with the number of best attributes parameter being statistically significant and of the expected 
sign. The latent class model performs considerably better again, with a log-likelihood of -
5218.52. 
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Table 10:  Identifying role of MCD - latent class model  
 Full Relevance APS Ignore 
Class 1 1 
Reference constant (1,0) -0.4207 (-0.67) -0.0676 (-1.06) 
SC1 constant (1,0) 0.0674 (1.27) 0.0852 (1.51) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.1234 (-16.52) -0.1448 (-16.6) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.1192 (-11.37) -0.1676 (-12.1) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) -0.0145 (-1.83) -0.0116 (-1.18) 
Running cost ($) -0.5467 (-15.04) -0.6980 (-14.9) 
Toll cost ($) -0.7159 (-12.92) -0.9038 (-18.0) 
Class 2 2 
# of attributes in an alternative that are best 0.2856 (2.76) 0.2665 (3.06) 
Probability of class  membership:   
Class 1 0.8465 (6.25) 0.8206 (9.58) 
Class 2 0.1535 (6.35) 0.1794 (8.17) 
BIC 1.7795 1.7287 
Log-likelihood at convergence -5402.47 -5218.52 
Sample size 6048 
APS Ignored:  
Free flow time (mins) - 944 
Slowed down time (mins) - 1504 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) - 2240 
Running cost ($) - 1120 
Toll cost ($) - 656 
 
These results suggest that some respondents are employing the MCD heuristic. Under the 
heuristic, trading is not occurring on the absolute attribute levels. What matters instead is which 
alternative has the best level for each attribute, where tallies of the number of best attributes 
appear to act as a supplementary step when determining the best alternative. Overall, the mean 
probability of class membership of each class in both models is over 0.8 for processing of the 
constituent attributes and between 0.15 and 0.18 for the number of attributes being the 
determining influence. 
The implication is that the application of the choice model must recognise that the trading 
amongst the attributes occurs up to a probability of 0.85 (or 0.82) on average, with the number 
of best attribute levels having an influence up to a probability of 0.15 (or 0.18) on average. This 
is an important finding that downplays the contribution of the marginal disutility of each 
attribute in the presence of the overall number of preferred attribute levels associated with an 
alternative. 
3.6  Influence of the relative attribute levels 
Another test relates to the relationship between the level of an attribute associated with the 
reference alternative and each of the other alternatives (Ref-SC1, Ref-SC2). We distinguished 
between differences where the reference alternative attribute level was better, equal and worse 
relative to SC1 and SC2. The choice response variable refers to the alternative chosen. A simple 
logit model was specified in which we included the best and worse attribute forms for all five 
design attributes (eliminating ‘worst’ for toll cost since there were no observations). The model 
is summarised in Table 11. Interpreting the parameter estimates is tricky. Where an attribute 
refers to a better level for the reference alternative (the difference for all attributes being 
negative on the attribute difference), a positive parameter estimate suggests that when the 
difference narrows towards zero, making the reference alternative relatively less attractive on 
that attribute, the probability of choosing a non-reference alternative (SC1 or SC2) increases. 
The parameter estimate is positive for ‘better’ except for trip time variability, producing the 
opposite behavioural response, which seems counter intuitive. The opposite behavioural 
response is found when the reference alternative is worse; all parameter estimates are positive 
suggesting that when the reference alternative becomes relatively less attractive (given it is 
worse), the probability of choosing SC1 or SC2 increases. 
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Table 11:  Influence of referencing on choice response 
6048 observations 
 
Reference minus SC1 or SC2 Percent of 
data 
Parameter estimates 
Free flow time better 37.7 0.0915 (12.1) 
Free flow time worse 62.3 0.0647 (7.45) 
Slowed down time better 47.8 0.0860 (5.25) 
Slowed down time worse 52.2 0.0770 (10.9) 
Variability in time better 40.5 -0.0347 (-1.89) 
Variability in time worse 59.5 0.0215 (1.84) 
Running cost better 38.8 0.3090 (4.72) 
Running cost worse 61.2 0.4996 (9.69) 
Toll cost better 100 0.6336 (30.4) 
Toll cost worse 0 - 
Stated Choice Alternative 2 
dummy (1,2) 
- 0.1186 (2.96) 
Log-likelihood at convergence -3118.56 
 
 
 
3.7  Revision of the reference alternative 
DeShazo (2002) suggested the idea of reference point revision in which preferences may be 
well-formed, but respondents’ value functions shift when a non-status-quo option is chosen (see 
also McNair et al. 2010b). The shift occurs because the selection of a non-status-quo option is 
viewed as a transaction up to a probability, and this causes a revision of the reference point 
around which the asymmetric value function predicted by prospect theory is centred (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979)8
 
.  
We ran a model in which we identified the chosen alternative from a previous choice set, and 
created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chosen alternative in the previous choice set was a 
non-reference alternative. We then introduced, into the utility expressions, the lagged response 
variable indicating what the previous choice was, as a way of investigating the role of value-
learning. We found (see Table 12) a mean estimate of 0.9357 (t-ratio of 15.73), which suggests 
that when a non-reference alternative is chosen, it revises the reference alternative in the next 
choice scenario, which increases the utility of the new ‘reference’ alternative. This is an 
important finding, supporting the hypothesis of DeShazo; it is also recognition of sequential 
interdependence between adjacent choice scenarios, which should be treated explicitly rather 
than through a correlated error variance specification, where the latter captures many 
unobserved effects at the alternative level. 
Table 12:  Identifying role of reference revision 
Note: Choice set 1 is removed 
 
Full Relevance 
Revised Reference (1,0) 0.9358 (15.73) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.01033 (-52.3) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.0972 (-17.4) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) -0.0178 (-2.96) 
Running cost ($) -0.4810 (-36.8) 
Toll cost ($) -0.6163 (-43.2) 
BIC 1.7637 
Log-likelihood at convergence -5027.00 
Sample size 5730 
 
                                                 
8 Swait and Adamowicz (2001) also discuss MCD, but only seem to use it as an inspiration for the calculation of an entropy 
measure that represents choice task complexity 
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Conclusions 
What does this evidence suggest for moving forward in the use of choice experiment data? We 
have identified a number of features of the choosing process that are associated with the design 
of the choice experiment, and the characteristics of respondents, that influence the stated choice 
outcome. Some very specific heuristics appear to have some systematic influence on choice, in 
particular the number of attributes that offer the best levels for an alternative, and the revision of 
the reference alternative as a result of value learning9
We present a model below as a contrast to the base model (Table 9, column 2 and column 5), 
where we include reference revision, majority of conforming dimensions, and eliminate choice 
, reflected in a previous choice in the 
choice set sequence. Building both of these features into the estimated choice model seems to be 
a useful step forward in recognition of process rule heterogeneity. We also believe that the 
simple rationality test proposed herein for the entire choice set, and for pairwise alternatives, is 
a useful tool in eliminating data, if required, that has individuals choosing an alternative that has 
no single attribute that is better. 
Another avenue for reconciling seemingly irrational choice behaviour stems from the 
recognition that the choice might be rational when a decision or process rule is employed by the 
decision maker. We have handled several decision rules in our analysis, namely the treatment of 
attributes as ignored using respondent self-explication, the application of the MCD heuristic, 
and revision of the reference alternative. However, other processes might be employed by the 
respondents that are not consistent with utility maximisation. For example, Gilbride and 
Allenby (2004) estimated a choice model that handled conjunctive and disjunctive screening 
rules, with choice treated as a compensatory process on the remaining alternatives. Here, a 
choice task that appears irrational might pass the rationality test after some alternatives have 
been eliminated in the screening stage. Swait (2009) allowed the unobserved utility of the 
choice alternatives to be in one of several discrete states. One of the states allowed conventional 
utility maximisation, while other states led to alternative rejection and alternative dominance. 
Again, rationality might prevail once the process rule is employed: in this case once rejection 
and dominance has been taken into account. We propose that one way to assess these and other 
new model forms is to determine how well they can explain decisions that appear irrational 
when viewed through the conventional prism of utility maximisation. 
Of interest to the analyst are possible ways in which irrational behaviour can be minimised in a 
stated choice environment. In our data, there appeared to be no link between the task order 
number and the rate of irrational behaviour, which suggests that the number of choice tasks 
might not have an impact, within reasonable limits. Choice task complexity (number of 
alternatives, attributes and attribute levels) was not varied in this analysis; however the impact 
of task complexity on irrational behaviour would be an interesting area of research. Also of 
interest is the rationality of choice in market conditions, which may be impacted by habit, mood, 
time pressure, and ease with which information can be compared. We anticipate that these 
influences would lead to a decrease in rationality of choice, either through an increase in errors, 
or an increase in use of decision rules and heuristics. If the aim of a stated choice task is to 
successfully predict market choices, encouraging rational choice in the stated choice 
environment might not actually be the best way forward. Survey realism might instead be more 
important. 
                                                 
9 Value learning in its broadest meaning implies underlying preferences are changing. Reference revision, on the other hand, can 
occur when preferences are stable but the objective is to maximise the likelihood of implementation of the most preferred 
alternative observed over the course of the sequence of questions. In a sense the latter is a special case of the former. We thank 
Ben McNair for pointing this out. 
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sets that fail the three-way and two-way rationality tests10
 
. Accommodating value learning 
through reference revision involves treating the first choice set differently; to allow for this we, 
introduce a dummy variable for the initial reference alternative for choice one only. We also 
include design and contextual variables that are correlates, to some degree, with the presence of 
non-trading in terms of always selecting the existing (i.e., non-revised) reference alternative 
across all 16 choice sets, or selection of the existing reference alternative in a specific choice 
set. 
Table 13:  Revised full model for applications 
Ignored 
Attributes 
Trip length (kilometres) -0.0098 (-7.54) 
Personal gross income ($’000s)  -0.0077 (-7.46) 
Business trip (compared to commuting and non-
commuting) 
-0.3490 (-5.27) 
Existing reference alternative time variability as 
percentage of worst time 
-0.8548 (-3.91) 
Percentage of total trip time in slowed down conditions 0.5703 (3.40) 
Amount of recent experience on toll roads (0-6) -0.0304 (-1.61) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.0909 (-23.6) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.0938 (-12.04) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) 0.0103 (1.34) 
Running cost ($) -0.4539 (-19.0) 
Toll cost ($) -0.6414 (-29.4) 
# of attributes in an alternative that are best 0.2646 (10.0) 
Reference revision (1,0)  0.8843 (13.8) 
Initial Choice Set Reference dummy (1,0) for choice 
sets 2-16 
1.1442 (8.99) 
BIC 1.6092 
Log-likelihood at convergence -4600.45 
Sample Size 5793 
 
The mean estimates of value of travel time savings in Table 13 for free flow time are $12.02 
based on the running cost parameter, and $8.50 based on the toll cost parameter. The equivalent 
VTTS for slowed down time are $12.40 and $8.77 per person hour. These estimates can be 
contrasted with the findings of the ‘base’ model (reported in Table 5) which only included the 
design attributes and constants for the existing reference alternative (without value learning), 
namely $11.62, $9.73 for free flow time, and $14.53 and $12.17 for slowed down time. In all 
but the valuation for free flow time with respect to running cost, when the additional influences 
in Table 13 are not taken into account, we find non-marginal over-estimation of the mean 
VTTS. 
This paper will hopefully engender an interest in further inquiry into the underlying sources of 
process heterogeneity that should be captured explicitly in the formulation of the utility 
expressions that represent the preference domain of each respondent for each alternative. 
Including additional attribute and alternative-processing related explanatory variables will 
provide plausible explanations of utility maximising behaviour in choice making. 
 
                                                 
10 In this particular data set, eliminating choice sets that fail the three-way and two-way rationality tests had so significant 
influence at all on the parameter estimates compared with including these data points. 
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Appendix  
Alternative FF SDT VAR RC TC TotT TotC choice1
1 (SQ) 20 0 0 2.6 0 20 2.6 0
2 17 2 6 2.21 4 19 6.21 0
3 26 3 4 2.99 1 29 3.99 1
1 (SQ) 8 2 2 1.2 0 10 1.2 0
2 7 1 6 1.02 4 8 5.02 0
3 10 2 4 1.38 1 12 2.38 1
1 (SQ) 60 0 30 7.8 0 60 7.8 0
2 51 2 34 6.63 0.5 53 7.13 0
3 69 2 34 8.97 3 71 11.97 1
1 (SQ) 25 0 18 3.25 0 25 3.25 0
2 29 4 12 2.28 0.5 33 2.78 0
3 29 3 15 4.23 3 32 7.23 1
1 (SQ) 30 0 5 3.9 0 30 3.9 0
2 39 2 6 4.49 0.5 41 4.99 1
3 34 4 6 3.32 2.5 38 5.82 0
1 (SQ) 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0
2 29 2 6 3.29 0.5 31 3.79 1
3 25 4 6 2.43 2.5 29 4.93 0
1 (SQ) 16 0 5 2.08 0 16 2.08 0
2 21 2 6 2.39 0.5 23 2.89 1
3 18 4 6 1.77 2.5 22 4.27 0
1 (SQ) 20 0 5 2.6 0 20 2.6 0
2 26 2 6 2.99 0.5 28 3.49 1
3 23 4 6 2.21 2.5 27 4.71 0
1 (SQ) 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0
2 29 3 4 3.29 1 32 4.29 1
3 15 2 4 3.72 3.5 17 7.22 0
1 (SQ) 35 10 2 5.33 0 45 5.33 0
2 46 8 4 6.13 1 54 7.13 1
3 24 7 4 6.93 3.5 31 10.43 0
1 (SQ) 8 2 2 1.2 0 10 1.2 0
2 10 2 4 1.38 1 12 2.38 1
3 6 1 4 1.55 3.5 7 5.05 0
1 (SQ) 40 5 8 5.59 0 45 5.59 0
2 28 6 5 7.27 3 34 10.27 0
3 34 6 6 7.27 0.5 40 7.77 1
1 (SQ) 50 10 10 7.28 0 60 7.28 0
2 35 13 7 9.46 3 48 12.46 0
3 42 13 8 9.46 0.5 55 9.96 1
1 (SQ) 25 5 8 3.64 0 30 3.64 0
2 18 6 5 4.73 3 24 7.73 0
3 21 6 6 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1
1 (SQ) 45 45 22 9.36 0 90 9.36 0
2 32 58 16 12.17 3 90 15.17 0
3 38 58 19 12.17 0.5 96 12.67 1
1 (SQ) 40 40 35 8.32 0 80 8.32 0
2 28 52 24 10.82 3 80 13.82 0
3 34 52 30 10.82 0.5 86 11.32 1
1 (SQ) 15 0 2 1.95 0 15 1.95 0
2 10 4 4 2.54 3 14 5.54 0
3 13 4 4 2.54 0.5 17 3.04 1
1 (SQ) 35 40 12 7.67 0 75 7.67 0
2 24 52 9 9.97 3 76 12.97 0
3 30 52 11 9.97 0.5 82 10.47 1
1 (SQ) 10 25 12 3.25 0 35 3.25 0
2 7 32 9 4.23 3 39 7.23 0
3 8 32 11 4.23 0.5 40 4.73 1
1 (SQ) 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0
2 15 4 4 3.72 3 19 6.72 0
3 19 4 4 3.72 0.5 23 4.22 1
1 (SQ) 30 7 6 4.45 0 37 4.45 0
2 21 9 5 5.78 3 30 8.78 0
3 26 9 6 5.78 0.5 35 6.28 1
1 (SQ) 90 0 45 11.7 0 90 11.7 0
2 63 4 32 15.21 3 67 18.21 0
3 76 4 38 15.21 0.5 80 15.71 1
1 (SQ) 65 25 15 10.4 0 90 10.4 0
2 46 32 10 13.52 3 78 16.52 0
3 55 32 13 13.52 0.5 87 14.02 1
1 (SQ) 55 5 12 7.54 0 60 7.54 0
2 38 6 9 9.8 3 44 12.8 0
3 47 6 11 9.8 0.5 53 10.3 1
1 (SQ) 20 20 10 4.16 0 40 4.16 0 
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Alternative FF SDT VAR RC TC TotT TotC choice1
1 (SQ) 25 0 18 3.25 0 25 3.25 0
2 18 4 12 4.23 3 22 7.23 0
3 21 4 15 4.23 0.5 25 4.73 1
1 (SQ) 55 10 15 7.93 0 65 7.93 0
2 38 13 10 10.31 3 51 13.31 0
3 47 13 13 10.31 0.5 60 10.81 1
1 (SQ) 240 30 30 33.54 0 270 33.54 0
2 168 39 21 43.6 3 207 46.6 0
3 204 39 26 43.6 0.5 243 44.1 1
1 (SQ) 30 15 8 5.07 0 45 5.07 0
2 21 20 5 6.59 3 41 9.59 0
3 26 20 6 6.59 0.5 46 7.09 1
1 (SQ) 30 15 40 5.07 0 45 5.07 0
2 21 20 28 6.59 3 41 9.59 0
3 26 20 34 6.59 0.5 46 7.09 1
1 (SQ) 35 10 2 5.33 0 45 5.33 0
2 24 13 4 6.93 3 37 9.93 0
3 30 13 4 6.93 0.5 43 7.43 1
1 (SQ) 15 5 6 2.34 0 20 2.34 0
2 10 6 5 3.04 3 16 6.04 0
3 13 6 6 3.04 0.5 19 3.54 1
1 (SQ) 15 5 2 2.34 0 20 2.34 0
2 10 6 4 3.04 3 16 6.04 0
3 13 6 4 3.04 0.5 19 3.54 1
1 (SQ) 25 5 18 3.64 0 30 3.64 0
2 18 6 12 4.73 3 24 7.73 0
3 21 6 15 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1
1 (SQ) 40 5 8 5.59 0 45 5.59 0
2 28 6 5 7.27 3 34 10.27 0
3 34 6 6 7.27 0.5 40 7.77 1
1 (SQ) 20 10 8 3.38 0 30 3.38 0
2 14 13 5 4.39 3 27 7.39 0
3 17 13 6 4.39 0.5 30 4.89 1
1 (SQ) 25 10 10 4.03 0 35 4.03 0
2 18 13 7 5.24 3 31 8.24 0
3 21 13 8 5.24 0.5 34 5.74 1
1 (SQ) 25 5 8 3.64 0 30 3.64 0
2 18 6 5 4.73 3 24 7.73 0
3 21 6 6 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1
1 (SQ) 17 3 4 2.44 0 20 2.44 0
2 12 4 2 3.18 3 16 6.18 0
3 14 4 3 3.18 0.5 18 3.68 1
1 (SQ) 45 15 15 7.02 0 60 7.02 0
2 32 20 10 9.13 3 52 12.13 0
3 38 20 13 9.13 0.5 58 9.63 1
1 (SQ) 30 10 10 4.68 0 40 4.68 0
2 21 13 7 6.08 3 34 9.08 0
3 26 13 8 6.08 0.5 39 6.58 1
1 (SQ) 35 10 8 5.33 0 45 5.33 0
2 24 13 5 6.93 3 37 9.93 0
3 30 13 6 6.93 0.5 43 7.43 1
1 (SQ) 8 2 2 1.2 0 10 1.2 0
2 6 3 4 1.55 3 9 4.55 0
3 7 3 4 1.55 0.5 10 2.05 1
1 (SQ) 17 3 8 2.44 0 20 2.44 0
2 12 4 5 3.18 3 16 6.18 0
3 14 4 6 3.18 0.5 18 3.68 1
1 (SQ) 20 5 12 2.99 0 25 2.99 0
2 14 6 9 3.89 3 20 6.89 0
3 17 6 11 3.89 0.5 23 4.39 1
1 (SQ) 50 40 15 9.62 0 90 9.62 0
2 35 52 10 12.51 3 87 15.51 0
3 42 52 13 12.51 0.5 94 13.01 1
1 (SQ) 22 3 4 3.09 0 25 3.09 0
2 15 4 2 4.02 3 19 7.02 0
3 19 4 3 4.02 0.5 23 4.52 1
1 (SQ) 20 10 15 3.38 0 30 3.38 0
2 14 13 10 4.39 3 27 7.39 0
3 17 13 13 4.39 0.5 30 4.89 1
1 (SQ) 90 0 15 11.7 0 90 11.7 0
2 63 4 10 15.21 3 67 18.21 0
3 76 4 13 15.21 0.5 80 15.71 1
1 (SQ) 50 10 15 7.28 0 60 7.28 0 
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